Constitutional Law - Land Use Control - Landmark Preservation by Myers, George William, Jr.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 16 
Number 4 Criminal Law and Criminal 
Procedure: Some Current Issues 
Article 17 
1978 
Constitutional Law - Land Use Control - Landmark Preservation 
George William Myers Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
George W. Myers Jr., Constitutional Law - Land Use Control - Landmark Preservation, 16 Duq. L. Rev. 813 
(1978). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol16/iss4/17 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LAND USE CONTROL-LANDMARK PRESER-
VATION-The New York Court of Appeals has held that landmark
regulation of commercial property is valid provided the landowner
is not deprived of all reasonable return from the designated land-
mark; in determining a reasonable return, the basic value is
limited to that worth contributed by the owner's efforts and the
return must include any benefit derived from development rights
made transferable by the regulation.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d
324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 2646
(1978).
On August 2, 1967, the City Landmarks Preservation Commis-
sion' (Commission) designated New York City's Grand Central
Railroad Terminal a landmark in accordance with the provisions of
the New York City Administrative Code. 2 Once so designated the
landmark was required to be kept in "good repair," and any altera-
tion or construction on the site would be regulated. Any unused
development rights resulting from the designation could be trans-
ferred to any nearby sites in accordance with the related sections of
the City's zoning provisions.'
In July of 1968, Penn Central Transportation Company, including
a number of its subsidiaries, and UGP Properties, Inc. attempted
to obtain permission from the Commission to erect an office build-
ing atop the Terminal.' All requests submitted were denied.,
1. New York City provided for landmark preservation by adding Chapter 8-A to its ad-
ministrative code pursuant to the state's enabling act. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 267-68, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 (1975).
Grand Central Terminal's classification as a landmark was never an issue in the case,
although Penn Central Transportation Company had objected to the designation when it was
first proposed by the Commission in 1967. The court noted: "along with the Empire State
Building and the Statue of Liberty, the image of its facade symbolizes New York City .... "
id. at 269, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25, and "[tihe historical, aesthetic and cultural significance
of Grand Central Terminal is not disputed," id. at 275, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 30 (Lupino, J.,
dissenting).
2. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1273,
397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (1977). The designation was confirmed by the Board of Estimates, after
receiving a report from the City Planning Commission, on September 21, 1967. Id. at 328,
366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
3. 50 App. Div. 2d at 268, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
4. 42 N.Y.S.2d at 328-29, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916. Penn Central had a
three-hundred year lease for the Terminal from the New York and Harlem Railroad Com-
pany, owner of the fee interest. The trustees of Penn Central in turn owned 95% of the New
York and Harlem Railroad Company. UGP, sub-lessee of the development rights above the
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 16: 813
Asserting that the landmark preservation provisions, both on
their face and as applied to the Terminal, authorized an unconstitu-
tional "taking" of property under the police power, Penn Central
filed suit on October 7, 1968, seeking declaratory relief and an in-
junction to prevent the Commission from enforcing the provisions
against Grand Central Terminal.' Trial term of the Supreme Court
terminal, was incorporated after the landmark designation was made and was a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a British company. 50 App. Div. 2d at 270, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 25-26.
The proposed office building would have been a tower exceeding 50 stories in height. UGP
was to pay Penn Central $1,000,000 per year during the construction phase and $3,000,000
annually thereafter. Id., 377 N.Y.S.2d at 26. Hereafter, reference to Penn Central will include
all the plaintiffs in the action.
5. 42 N.Y.2d at 329, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917. Complete procedures were
available to allow for alterations to the landmark. The owner could seek a "certificate of no
exterior effect" or, if there would be an exterior effect, he could seek a "certificate of appropri-
ateness." 50 App. Div. 2d at 268, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 24. Penn Central first sought permission
to construct the office building, claiming that the work would have "no exterior effect" on
the protected architectural features because the office building would be above the landmark.
After that request was denied, additional applications were made to the commission seeking
approval based on the fact that the new office building would be "appropriate" to occupy
the site atop Grand Central Terminal. 42 N.Y.2d at 329, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d
at 916-17.
Penn Central had architect Marcel Breuer and Associates make three different propos-
als-Breuer I, Breuer II, and Breuer II, revised-in an attempt to gain an approval. 50 App.
Div. 2d at 270, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 26. Breuer I would not have effected the main concourse or
any other part of the terminal actually used in railroad operations. Also, the facade of the
terminal would have remained untouched. The plan "constituted a present-day application
of a principle which had been embodied in the original plans for the present Terminal
building." The original plans of the terminal had shown an office building over the present
facade although it was not built. In contrast, Breuer II and Breuer II, revised would not have
preserved the south facade of the terminal. The basic difference between all the Breuer
proposals and the "original plans" is that a much taller building of modern design was to be
built. Id. at 275-76, 377 N.Y.S.2d at, 31 (Lupino, J., dissenting). But cf. Respondent's Brief
at 18, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 344, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977) (the original plans for a twenty-story office tower were "obviously"
discarded and the 1911 plan suggested a tower which cannot be compared with that proposed
by Penn Central).
Neither the administrative decisions designating the terminal as a landmark nor those
rejecting the applications for certificates were judicially challenged. 42 N.Y.2d at 329, 366
N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917. Cf. Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d
121, 126-28, 316 N.E.2d 305, 308-09, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 11-13 (1974) (the reasonableness of the
landmark designation could not be put at issue because the administrative decision to desig-
nate the church a landmark was not judicially challenged).
6. 50 App. Div. 2d at 271, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 26. Damages were also sought for the "taking"
from the time of landmark designation to the time of the judicial invalidation sought. The
question of damages, however, was severed from the proceedings. 42 N.Y.2d at 329, 366
N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
While an administrative remedy, e.g., tax relief, exists on the grounds of "insufficient
return" for taxpaying commercial property or nontax exempt property used for charitable
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of New York County, New York granted the relief.7 It found Penn
Central was suffering such economic hardship that it did not receive
a reasonable return on the property;8 therefore, New York City's
actions constituted a "taking" of private property without compen-
sation, denying Penn Central due process of law.'
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision,
reversed and granted judgment for defendant City of New York.,'
The court reasoned that prior decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals and the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
had held that the landmarks preservation law was valid on its face
and that the sole issue was whether Penn Central had met its bur-
den of proving that the line between valid and unconstitutional
regulation had been crossed in the application of the law." The test
applied was the same as that used in zoning cases: whether the
regulation deprived the owner of all "reasonable beneficial use" of
his property. Although losses were shown in the operation of the
terminal, the court ultimately found that Penn Central had not
been deprived of all "reasonable beneficial use" of its property. 2
purposes, the Terminal was commercial property which received a partial real estate tax
exemption, thereby making it ineligible to apply for this relief. 50 App. Div. 2d at 268, 271,
377 N.Y.S.2d at 24, 26.
7. See 42 N.Y.2d at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
8. See 50 App. Div. 2d at 271, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 26. But see note 11 infra (the Appellate
Division's analysis of the actual basis for the trial court's decision).
9. See 50 App. Div. 2d at 277, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 32 (Lupino, J., dissenting).
10. See 42 N.Y.2d at 328-29, 366 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
11. The intermediate appellate court stated that the lower court had misapplied the court
of appeal's recent decision in Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316
N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974), where landmark regulation was found unconstitutional
as applied to property owned by a charitable institution: the property was "taken" because
the regulation seriously interferred with or prevented the carrying out of the owner's charita-
ble purpose. The trial court mistakenly believed that Lutheran Church stood for the proposi-
tion that landmark regulation ipso facto required compensation. 50 App. Div. 2d at 271, 377
N.Y.S.2d at 26-27. In the eyes of the intermediate appellate court, however, Lutheran Church
only held the landmark designation unconstitutional when the landowner was deprived of any
reasonable use thereof. Id. at 271, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
12. 50 App. Div. 2d at 273-74, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29. The majority considered that several
of the costs allocated to the Terminal property were actually operating expenses of the
railroad, that it was error not to assign a rental value to the space used by the railroad, and
that a full scope analysis by Penn Central must include unused potential to increase the
revenues. Id.
In contrast, Judges Lupino and Markewich viewed the burden on Penn Central as massive
and concurred with Penn Central's analysis of costs. Id. at 278-84, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 33-38
(Lupino, J., dissenting). The dissent all but announced that any restrictions upon a landmark
owner different from those imposed on others in the community would be unconstitutional.
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THE DECISION OF THE COURT
In a unanimous decision the New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed. 3 Authoring the opinion, Chief Judge Breitel' 4 stated that
the landmark regulations were constitutionally valid as applied be-
cause the commercial property owner was assured a "reasonable
return" on his "privately created ingredient of property."' 5
The court first defined landmark regulation as neither zoning
regulation" nor historic district regulation. 7 Landmark regulation
is primarily distinguishable from both because it affects only indi-
vidual landmarks, and thus resembles "discriminatory" zoning."8
The cultural, architectural, historical, or social significance of the
affected property, however, provides the rational basis for landmark
regulation which distinguishes it from discriminatory zoning, and
thus permits it to hurdle equal protection objections il Further,
landmark regulation did not amount to a "taking" where "just com-
pensation" must be paid because there is no "governmentfdisplace-
ment of private ownership, occupation or management." The court
"The Terminal is to be preserved [according to the majority] in its pristine state for the
benefit of all and the bill for this is presented solely to Penn Central." Id. at 284, 377 N.Y.S.2d
at 38 (Lupino, J., dissenting). The dissenters were in full agreement with the trial court's
reading of Lutheran Church, that compensation must come with regulation of a landmark.
Id. at 287, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 40 (Lupino, J., dissenting).
13. 42 N.Y.2d at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1373, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
14. For a short discussion of other opinions authored by Chief Judge Breitel in land use
jurisprudence, see note 34 infra.
15. 42 N.Y.2d at 327, 331, 334-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 1275, 1277-78, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
915-16, 918, 920-21.
16. Id. at 329-30, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917. In zoning, "[e]ach property
owner. . . is both benefited and restricted. . . ." Id. However, under landmark regulation
the landmark owner is restricted not so much for his own benefit as for the benefit of the
greater community. Further, the court stated that zoning's purpose is to advance a compre-
hensive community plan unlike the purpose of landmark regulation. Id.
17. Id. Again, the landowner in historic districting is benefited as well as regulated while
the landmark owner is arguably only regulated. The "owners within the historic district
although burdened by the restrictions also benefit . . . from the furtherance of a general
community plan." Id. A district historically regulated is very similar to a zoned area but the
restrictions in the historic district concentrate on preventing alterations or demolitions of
existing structures, like single landmark regulations, in lieu of controlling the building of new
structures. Id.
18. Id. at 330-31, 366 N.E.2d at 1274-75, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918. "Discriminatory" or "spot"
zoning is unconstitutional because there is no acceptable reason for the differences in the
regulations, thus violating equal protection guarantees. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 329-30, 335-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917, 921 (referring to
French Investing Co.). See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York (Tudor Parks),
39 N.Y.2d 587, 595, 350 N.E.2d 381, 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 10 (1976).
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noted that "government displacement" or a "taking" requiring just
compensation occurs only when a regulation's intent or effect is to
impact the land with irreversible "trespassory consequences."',
The court therefore framed the constitutional issue as whether the
regulation of property designated a landmark had, under the police
power, gone so far as to deny all the uses of the land that would
assure the owner a continuing "reasonable return.""2 In evaluating
the return for the purpose of determining if it is reasonable the court
examined the difficult conceptual barriers facing such a formula-
tion." It was recognized that this ratio of income to outlay, which
to an accountant would be a simple calculation, was an "elusive
concept" to courts dealing with these issues. While despairing that
the determination of the basic value and the return under the regu-
lation was inherently circular, the court believed that a "fair" ap-
proximation of the return was nevertheless possible and would serve
as a viable guide to judicial decision making." The court's analysis
required that the value of the property be ascertained before the
reasonableness of the return could be determined. In formulating
this amount, the court discussed the worth of the property and
distinguished "society's contribution" from the "privately created"
elements of its value.25 The fact that Grand Central Terminal was
21. 39 N.Y.2d at 595, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (citing Costonis, "Fair"
Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land
Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021, 1035 (1975) [hereinafter cited as "Fair"
Compensation]). "Instead landmark regulation is a limitation on exploitation of property,
an attribute shared with the classifications of zoning and historic districting." 42 N.Y.2d at
330, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (emphasis added).
22. 42 N.Y.2d at 327, 331, 335-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1272, 1275, 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 915,
198, 921 (citing French Investing Co., 39 N.Y.2d at 596, 350 N.E.2d at 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d at
10). The "reasonable return" requirement is based upon due process guarantees of the Consti-
tution. 42 N.Y.2d at 327, 366 N.E.2d at 1272, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
Land use regulation is unconstitutional if it results in the property being unsuitable for any
"reasonable income" and thus destroys its economic value, "or all but a . . . residue of its
value." The property owner is thereby left with only "bare title." French Investing Co., 39
N.Y.2d at 596-97, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 10-11.
23. 42 N.Y.2d at 331-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-78, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918-21.
24. Id. at 331, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918. The value of the land which is
the base against which the return is measured to determine reasonableness is a function of
the uses to which it can be put. These uses and thus the basic value are restricted by the
landmark regulation just as is the value of the return. Id. It should be noted that the landmark
ordinance provides for a return of at least 6 percent. See Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A
Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HAv. L. Rav. 402, 422 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as The Disparity Issue].
25. 42 N.Y.2d at 328, 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916, 921.
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a public utility," had real estate tax exemptions,2 and enjoyed
many other indirect benefits from societyu lessened the figure which
was to be used as the value of the property in distilling the
"privately created" elements.2 As "inseparably joint" as these pri-
vate and societal interests were, the court felt that they had to be
distinguished conceptually.s
The court's second step was to determine what quantum of return
Penn Central has received under the regulation. Penn Central's
primary contention was that the Terminal was operating at a loss.
The court rejected this as a controlling factor, and instead, looked
beyond the current financial situation to the potential of the prop-
erty as regulated to produce a reasonable return under efficient
management.3 The court added that a further monetary component
needed to be considered in the "reasonable return" analysis: the
income from Penn Central's "heavy real estate holding" in the im-
mediate vicinity of Grand Central Terminal. Analogizing Grand
Central Terminal to a "flagship store" in a shopping center, Chief
Judge Breitel believed that, realistically, some of this income must
be "imputed" to the Terminal because of Penn Central's ability to
draw potential customers to its other businesses in the immediate
vicinity of the terminal.3 2
Moreover, the court explained, Penn Central had not been
"wholly" deprived of the right to develop above the terminal but
merely had these rights transferred to other property in the area,
some of which Penn Central owned. Recognizing the deficiencies
that exist in the statutorily provided transfer of rights, the court
found, nevertheless, that these transferable rights were valuable
and must be included as another factor.33 The court distinguished
26. Id * at 332, 366 N.E.2d at 1286, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919. Judge Breitel noted public utilities
to be "favored monopolies at public expense" with limited powers of eminent domain. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 331-33, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918-19. "Grand Central Ter-
minal is no ordinary landmark. It may be true that no property has economic value in the
absence of the society around it, but how much more true it is of a railroad terminal, set amid
a metropolitan population . I..." Id. at 331, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
29. For a discussion of the "social increment of value theory", see notes 66 and 67 infra.
30. 42 N.Y.2d at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
31. Id. The court announced that inadequate management would not be allowed to invali-
date land use restrictions.
32. Id. at 333-34, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
33. Id. at 334-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1278-79, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.
Transferable development rights, often called TDRs, increase the worth of the transferee
property because these rights significantly raise the limits imposed by the present zoning on
Vol. 16: 813
1977-78 Recent Decisions
the transferable development rights provided in Penn Central from
those provided by the zoning regulations in Fred F. French Investing
Co. v. City of New York (Tudor Parks).1 Because the restricted
landowner in French Investing Co. held no other property, unlike
Penn Central which held property to which the rights could be
transferred, the court found them deficient because they were not
"readily attachable" and thus unable to provide a "reasonable re-
turn."
Exclusive of the transferable development rights discussion, the
court considered its rationale consistent with its decision in
Lutheran Church v. City of New York 3l and the appellate division's
decision in Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt.3 7 In both
cases the landmark preservation provisions were upheld as facially
constitutional. However, economic considerations prevented the
tax-exempt charity in Lutheran Church from maintaining the land-
mark building and therefore the regulation was found invalid as
applied, 38 and because additional facts were needed, Sailors' was
the recipient parcels to allow the expansion of an existing structure or a larger replacement
structure, resulting in more income to the property. For a further discussion of development
rights, see Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The
Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BuniAwO L. Rav. 77, 85-94 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Mandatory Development Rights].
34. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 597-99, 350 N.E.2d 381, 387-88, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11-12, appeal di.-
missed for want of jurisdiction, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (a zoning case holding
landowner must be allowed a reasonable return).
The author of the unanimous opinion in French Investing Co. was also Chief Judge Breitel.
Id. Cf. Golden v. Planning Board (Ramapo), 30 N.Y.2d 359, 383-93, 285 N.E.2d 291, 305-11,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 156-65 (Breitel, J., dissenting) (in discussing the zoning ordinance's prohi-
bition on development until supporting facilities are available, in some cases a delay of up
to 18 years, he said, "Ithere is little doubt that the compulsion of current interests and
conflicts will require a re-examination of much legal and judicial thinking in this area"),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749,
279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967) (in establishing police power to prohibit nonaccessory billboards to
protect a community's aesthetics, Breitel incorporated in his opinion the dissent's view in the
case overruled by Cromwell that "[c]ircumstances, surrounding conditions, changed social
attitudes, newly acquired knowledge, do not alter the Constitution, but they do alter our view
of what is reasonable").
35. 42 N.Y.2d at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
36. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
37. 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 388 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968) (power of the Commission to constitu-
tionally regulate landmarks established).
38. 42 N.Y.2d at 334, 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920. Although the Landmark
Preservation Law has withstood constitutional attacks on its facial validity, it has had diffi-
culty in being constitutionally applied. 50 App. Div. 2d at 266, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
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inconclusive on the question of the regulation's constitutionality as
applied.3
As a result of weighing the benefits received by Penn Central in
the form of transferable development rights0 and income imputed
from ownership of Grand Central Terminal on the one hand, against
the denial of use of the air rights above the Terminal on the other,
the court determined that Penn Central was receiving a reasonable
return." The court viewed its evaluation of the landmark regula-
tions as a middle road in land-use control between requiring "just
compensation" and requiring no compensation at all."2
THE PROPERTY RAIN BARREL43
The issues underlying the constitutionality of land use control for
landmark preservation raised by Penn Central can be traced to the
United States Constitution. The fifth amendment," a limitation on
the federal government, provides that no one shall "be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
39. See 42 N.Y.2d at 334, 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920. The case was re-
manded because additional facts had to be developed. Id.
40. Id. at 335-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1278-79, N.Y.S.2d at 921-22. The court highlighted the
use of these transferable development rights and called them "substitute rights" which pro-
vided "fair" compensation for the loss of rights above the terminal itself. This "fair" compen-
sation provided by the transferable development rights insured that the owner was not de-
prived of due process. Id. at 335, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
41. Id. at 336-37, 366 N.E.2d at 1279, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
42. Id. at 337, 366 N.E.2d at 1279, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 922. Improvement of the statute was
suggested in dictum because it protected some property owners inadequately. Further, the
court invited Penn Central to present additional evidence to the trial court that addresses
the analysis required by the decision. Id.
43. Real property is not just the metes and bounds of Blackacre but it is moreover the
"bundle of rights" given the owner. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 95 (1936). See Preface to R.
BROUGHTON, MEASURES OF PROPERTY RIGHTs at vii (1977).
The author will use a "rain barrel" to represent the receptacle of that portion of the "bundle
of rights" which permit the landowner to use and develop his land. The size of the conceptual
"rain barrel" is fixed; what varies is the volume of water, the magnitude of rights to use the
land. The level is never fixed; rather, it changes constantly. "Fair" Compensation, supra note
21, at 1026 (citing Professor Philbrick, "the concept of property never has been, is not, and
never can be of definite content"). See French Investing Co., 39 N.Y.2d at 597, 350 N.E.2d
at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11 (the value of "property is not a concrete or tangible attribute but
an abstraction derived from the economic uses to which the property may be put").
44. For the historical development and background of the fifth amendment, see
Mandatory Development Rights, supra note 33, at 85-89.
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tion."' 5 The fourteenth amendment has an identical "due process""
provision which limits state actions and has been held to incorpo-
rate the "just compensation" provision of the fifth amendment.' 7
Exactly what limitation, if any, these words place on the power of
the state is the heart of the Penn Central land use control contro-
versy.48
The leading case" interpreting the constitutional language is
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.50 Under the challenged law, the
defendant coal company lost its right5' to mine certain coal deposits
because such mining could cause subsidence endangering individual
homes.52 Speaking for the majority, Justice Holmes announced that
if the state's regulation goes too far, it is a "taking" and thus invali-
dated the law and allowed the mining to continue." This resulted
in a dichotomy: at one extreme, if land regulation went too far,
causing too much "diminution in value," then "just compensation"
for the land's "highest and best" use under the eminent domain
power was required; at the other extreme, if "diminution in value"
is not large enough to be a "taking," no compensation was required
for the regulation." This all or nothing approach to compensation
for land use regulation has been much criticized," and demonstrates
the basic tension in Penn Central.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), classically cited for
the diminution in value precept: when regulation goes too far it becomes a "taking" requiring
"just compensation."
48. The following four works provide further analysis of many of the issues and arguments
involved in the "taking" controversy: Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Con-
troversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. Rzv. 799, passim (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Reply to Professor Costonis]; The Disparity Issue, supra note 24, passim; "Fair"
Compensation, supra note 21, passim; Mandatory Development Rights, supra note 33, at 86.
49. For an analysis of earlier cases involving the fifth amendment, see Mandatory Devel-
opment Rights, supra note 33, at 97-98.
50. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
51. At that time, subsurface rights were recognized as a separate estate in land in Pennsyl-
vania. Id. at 414.
52. Id. at 412-13.
53. Id. at 415.
54. Id. For a discussion of the irony of Justice Holmes writing for the majority in
Pennsylvania Coal in light of his dissenting opinions in other police power cases, see
Mandatory Development Rights, supra note 33, at 98-100; "Fair" Compensation, supra note
21, at 1033-34.
55. 42 N.Y.2d at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921. See "Fair" Compensation,
supra note 21, at 1033-38; Mandatory Development Rights, supra note 33, at 98-105.
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While Pennsylvania Coal has commonly been cited only for its
discussion on the taking element of the fifth amendment, it also
indicated that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
might introduce additional considerations." These "due process"
concerns foreshadowed the direction that the law was about to take.
The foundation57 for modem land use control without the payment
of any compensation was laid by Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 18 in which a zoning ordinance was held valid although the prop-
erty value was greatly reduced by the regulation." In establishing
the limit beyond which regulation cannot go, the Court two years
later in Nectow v. City of Cambridge6 0 analyzed the due process
clauses of the Constitution and formulated the test as whether there
has been a denial of all adequate return on the property."' The test
has been further refined and is now stated as whether the owner is
denied reasonable beneficial use of his property.62
While this test at first appears to give definite guidance in an-
swering what amount of development rights the government may
"dip" out of the landowner's property rain barrel, upon closer exam-
ination, it becomes painfully clear that the test is not easily applied
in close situations because the elements of the test are not yet well
defined and the rights of the landowner do not remain constant in
the law. This is best demonstrated by Penn Central itself wherein
over half the opinion is spent in applying the formulation. 63 At the
outset, there must be a determination of what will be included in
the basic value of the property and what shall be included in the
scope of benefits received by the landowner to calculate the amount
56. 260 U.S. at 413, 415.
57. See The Disparity Issue, supra note 24, at 403.
58. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
59. In Euclid, the general scope of the zoning ordinance was challenged, not its specific
application, and the Court concluded that it was not arbitrary or unreasonable and, therefore,
was a valid exercise of the police power. Id.
60. 277 U.S. 183 (1927) (zoning regulation excluded business and industrial uses of the
property and residential use would be impractical).
61. Id. at 187.
62. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (landowner has the burden of prov-
ing the regulation was "unreasonable"); Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d
121, 316 N.E.2d 365, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) (landowner deprived of the reasonable use of his
land); Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933
(1971) (landowner cannot be denied all beneficial use of his property); Vernon Park Reality,
Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) (an unreasonable zoning
ordinance constitutes a deprivation of property without due process).
63. 42 N.Y.2d at 331-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-78, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918-21.
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of return. Then, with these facts, the court must determine as a
matter of law whether the return is "reasonable." Although some
commentators view the task as impossible, 4 Judge Breitel consid-
ered that it had to be undertaken."
Limiting the basic worth of property to that worth privately cre-
ated and privately managed was introduced in Penn Central as a
new factor to be reckoned with in determining the basic value of the
land." This so called "social increment of value" theory in effect
made it more difficult for Penn Central to demonstrate that the
quantum of income received was not reasonable when compared
against only the worth of the land contributed exclusive of the
''social increment." Whether inclusion of this factor by the court
was a unique rule or test for Penn Central or was intended to have
lasting judicial value as a legal principle is unclear."
The precedential value of Penn Central emanates from the novel
theory that transferable development rights may be used to assure
that the owner receives a "reasonable return."'"8 Implicit in this
application is the conclusion that if the regulation did deprive the
owner of a "reasonable return," these transferable rights could be
added or increased by the governing body to restore the rate of
return to the constitutionally mandated "reasonable" level." Thus
an answer is given to the inquiry as to what level the rain barrel
64. Reply to Professor Costonis, supra note 48, at 818-23. Professor Berger would use a
balancing test to determine whether a regulation had been unconstitutionally imposed. If the
public benefit derived was greater than the detriment to the private citizen then the regula-
tion would stand even if the landowner lost all "reasonable beneficial use" of his property.
Id. at 823. The major difference between Professors Berger and Costonis is that Professor
Costonis believes that the legislators and the courts can determine what is reasonable benefi-
cial use, which is really a reflection of the American consensus as to what as a minimum a
land owner is entitled. The Disparity Issue, supra note 24, at 423 n.74.
65. 42 N.Y.2d at 331, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918. The concept of reasonable
return is deemed elusive and the method of defining it circular because "the reasonableness
of the return must be based on the value of the property, and the value of the property
necessarily depends on the return permitted or available." Id. For detailed discussions of the
reasonable beneficial use standard within the framework of all possible uses of land, see
"Fair" Compensation, supra note 21, at 1049-55.
66. 42 N.Y.2d at 327, 331-33, 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 1275-76, 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
916, 918-19, 921. Specifically excluded was that portion of the land's value attributable to
indirect social and direct governmental investment. Id.
67. See The Disparity Issue, supra note 24, at 415-17.
68. 42 N.Y.2d at 334-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1277-78, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920-22. The court empha-
sized the requirement that the owner of the transferable development rights must also own
land in the area into which these rights may be transferred in order to make them valuable.
Id. at 327, 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916, 921.
69. See generally The Disparity Issue, supra note 24, at 418-21.
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must be refilled when the unconstitutional level is reached and
breached. The "rain barrel" need not be monetarily replenished to
compensate the landowner for the "highest and best use"70 of his
land as would be necessary under eminent domain, the one extreme
of the Pennsylvania Coal dichotomy. Instead, reasonable beneficial
use was announced in Penn Central as the standard for both the
regulation, as was previously the law, and now the "compensation"
which is to be paid.7 Further, the "compensation" does not have to
be scarce tax dollars, but may be the right to develop other property
beyond the present zoning limits, albeit property under the regu-
lated landowner's control.7" The court drew a line between those
transferable development rights provided for in the zoning scheme
considered in French Investing Co. and those provided Penn Central
under the landmark regulation.73 In French Investing Co., Chief
Judge Breitel, again writing for a unanimous court, found the trans-
fer scheme too "contingency ridden" because the development
rights were transferable to no particular parcel but to another de-
tached area of mid-Manhattan in which the holder of the develop-
ment rights owned no property. It was concluded that these uncer-
tainties undercut the potential value of these rights to the point that
they could not be recognized.7' These uncertainties were not present
in Penn Central because the restricted landowner held property in
the transfer district.7"
70. It is important to remember that the New York courts had carefully circumscribed
the area in which a "taking" requiring "just compensation" operated. In New York, a
"taking," often called reverse or inverse condemnation, will only be found where government
has taken over management of the property or has trespassed upon it. See notes 20 and 21
and accompanying text supra.
71. The compensation, here in the form of transferable development rights, is due only
when the property is over-regulated. When the owner is denied all reasonable beneficial use,
the government has to make-up the difference.
72. 42 N.Y.2d at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921. See The Disparity Issue,
supra note 24, at 418.
73. 42 N.Y.2d at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921. The only substantial
difference between the French Investing Co. transferable development rights and those in
Penn Central is the coincidence that Penn Central owned property within the area to which
the development rights from the Terminal could be transferred. The Disparity Issue, supra
note 24, at 418-21.
74. 39 N.Y.2d at 597-98, 350 N.E.2d at 387-88, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12. See The Disparity
Issue, supra note 24, at 419-20, for a discussion highlighting the great potential value that
these transferable development rights apparently did have and the fine distinction between
using transferable development rights as a supplement to an existing return and their use as
the only return.
75. 42 N.Y.2d at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1277-78, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920-21.
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In theory, there was no need for the line to be drawn such that
transferable development rights are constitutionally valuable only
when the owner of the rights and the owner to the transferee prop-
erty are one and the same. These rights are valuable regardless of
who owns the transferee property, because they can be sold by the
restricted landowner to anyone in the transfer district who desires
to develop beyond the existing zoning or other regulatory limita-
tions." This arguably arbitrary line drawing in Penn Central, which
ignores" the value of transferable development rights unless there
is a common ownership of the transferor and transferee property,
nullifies to a great extent the implementation of this "middle way"
of using transferable development rights to give "fair compensa-
tion," particularly where it is most sorely needed-land use provi-
sions to maintain our aesthetic and ecological environment.', Con-
sider the use of transferable development rights to allow land use
regulation to stand where a municipality attempted to protect the
natural character of the land at the edges of lakes and navigable
rivers."' The whole theoretical scheme would be quashed if the
landowner did not own other property or did not own property that
was within the transfer district.
76. For a detailed analysis of the theoretical basis for the value of transferable develop-
ment rights, see Professor Costonis' "Fair" Compensation, supra note 21, at 1055-70.
A related issue, but not developed herein, is that to provide areas into which the develop-
ment rights can be transferred, the receiving propperty is also necessarily restricted by land
use regulations. Therefore, to provide for a continuing proliferation of transferring, the per-
mitted uses on the transferee property may have to be further limited by new zoning restric-
tions to insure adequate areas for the development rights to be transferred into; all being done
within the comprehensive plan. For an analysis of the impact of the social increment of value
theory revealed by Penn Central on the above considerations, see The Disparity Issue, supra
note 24, at 417-18.
77. In fairness to Chief Judge Breitel one can conjecture that this was well realized and
that the decision had to be written in this manner to make the court unanimous, leaving to
a later date the full implementation of the theory into practice.
78. See generally The Disparity Issue, supra note 24, at 420-21. Professor Costonis noted
that ironically the addition to the statutory scheme allowing the development rights to be
transferred regardless of ownership, which was to enhance their value, appears to be the very
factor that would invalidate them as being "too contingency ridden" under the court's reason-
ing. Id.
79. See, e.g., Morris County Land v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 193
A.2d 232 (1963) (municipality could not constitutionally zone swampland to keep it in its
natural state and deprive the landowner of any benefits from the property). See also "Fair"
Compensation, supra note 21, at 1047-48.
Duquesne Law Review
CONCLUSION
The level in the landowner's "rain barrel" must be, as a mini-
mum, that which represents sufficient rights to develop and use his
property to provide a reasonable use and return therefrom. The
evolution from Pennsylvania Coal's dichotomy-regulation without
compensation until reaching too great a diminution in value which
springs the expensive "just compensation" trap-to Penn Central's
"middle way" has taken 55 years. What was held in Pennsylvania
Coal as a "taking" requiring "just compensation" would become
only invalid over-regulation under Penn Cenntral.so Further, the
statutory scheme validated by Penn Central could remedy the de-
fect by providing the landowner with transferable development
rights so that the constitutionally mandated modicum of profit
could still be realized.
Penn Central may be the culmination of a long struggle to pro-
perly interpret the interrelationship between substantive "due pro-
cess" and "just compensation for a taking."'" The New York courts
have, through careful development of their case law and a well
reasoned opinion in Penn Central, molded constitutional doctrines
to deal with the land regulation to meet present day realities. By
affirming 2 the work done by New York courts to focus the inquiry
80. See "Fair" Compensation, supra note 21, at 1043 (Pennsylvania Coal only invalidated
the statute).
It is noted that another possible interpretation of what the defendant coal company suf-
fered is that the statute "displaced" the coal company's private ownership, occupation, or
management of the property. If so, then Justice Holmes' conclusion that defendant's property
was taken would be correct although the reasoning process in the opinion may have been
obscure.
In summary, when over-regulation is at issue, the "just compensation" clause of the fifth
amendment does not apply, instead the fourteenth amendment's due process clause requiring
"rudimentary" fairness is invoked. The Disparity Issue, supra note 24, at 412.
81. 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
82. During the judicial struggle to define these limitations on the state's police power, the
Supeme Court has spoken only sporadically. For example, Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), estab-
lished police power land use controls, Nectow, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), added the adequate return
test as to how the controls were applied, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 1954), spoke tangen-
tially to the issue in broadening the use of eminent domain to include both "public use" and
"public purpose," and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), saw no other limit
to the police power except that delineated by the "general welfare."
The many issues as to what is the "general welfare," whether it expands or contracts the
police power to regulate, and the constitutional necessity for regional planning in providing
for "fair share" housing for all, see, e.g., National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township,
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), do not seem to be issues, at least in this type of landmark
regulation case.
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on at least "asking the right question," 3 the Supreme Court has
assured that landowners receive at least "reasonable beneficial use"
of their land while allowing the municipality flexability to meet
their goals without mandating monetary compensation.8 4
George William Myers, Jr.
83. "Fair" Compensation, supra note 21, at 1051-55.
84. 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978) (6-3 decision). The Supreme Court clearly recognized that
transferable developments can have value to provide the landowner with a reasonable return
on the property. Id. at 2666.

